

## Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 USNATO 7000

E.O. 11652: GDS

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SUBJECT: NPG-COMMENTS ON HAMBURG MINISTERIAL AGENDA

REF: A. USNATO 6857 (DTG 130840Z DEC 75)

B. USNATO 4136 (DTG 061715Z AUG 75)

C. USNATO 6897 (DTG 161745Z DEC 75)

D. USNATO 6545 (DTG 291130Z NOV 75)

E. USNATO 6311 (DTG 191802 NOV 75)

F. STATE 239516 (DTG 080004Z OCT 75)

G. USNATO 5231 (DTG 250925Z SEP 75)

SUMMARY: OUR COMMENTS ON ITEMS ON HAMBURG NPG AGENDA FOLLOW.  
UPDATE BRIEFING ON STRATEGIC BALANCE WILL BE A SUBJECT OF KEY  
INTEREST TO ALLIED MINISTERS; THEY WILL BE PARTICULARLY INTERESTED  
IN RELATIONSHIP OF STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENTS TO SALT. DISCUSSION OF  
US NUCLEAR EMPLOYMENT POLICY PROVIDES OPPORTUNITY TO AMPLIFY  
PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS IN NPG ON MODIFICATIONS IN US STRATEGIC  
TARGETING POLICY, AND TO EMPHASIZE COUPLING OF STRATEGIC DETERRENT  
TO EUROPE. WE ANTICIPATE THAT ALLIES WILL VIEW SACEUR'S  
SELECTIVE EMPLOYMENT PLANNING (SEP'S) AS CONTRIBUTION TO ENHANCING  
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RESPONSIVENESS OF SELECTIVE RELEASE PROCESS AND WILL ENCOURAGE  
FURTHER PROGRESS BY SACEUR. WE BELIEVE THAT NUCLEAR FORCE  
POSTURE ISSUES WILL BE MOST IMPORTANT ITEM ON NPG AGENDA. WE  
BELIEVE PRESENTATION OF A CAREFUL, ELEMENTARY AND COHESIVE

EXPLANATION OF OVERALL THEATER NUCLEAR FORCE (TNF) STRUCTURE CHARACTERISTICS THAT WE WISH TO ACHIEVE IN NATO WOULD PROVIDE BEST WAY OF ESTABLISHING FRAMEWORK FOR ALLIED CONSIDERATION OF TNF POSTURE CHANGES. ALLIES WILL LOOK TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE TO LEAD THE DISCUSSION ON THIS ITEM. IT WOULD BE USEFUL IN DISCUSSION OF PHASE III TO CALL ATTENTION TO PAPER ON US EMPLOYMENT POLICY AS CONTRIBUTION TO PROPOSED PREPARATION OF CONSOLIDATED GUIDELINES FOR USE OF THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES. WE ANTICIPATE BRIEF DISCUSSIONS ON REMAINING ITEMS ON COUNTRY REQUESTS FOR USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, WARNING MESSAGES, AND FUTURE WORK PROGRAM. CONCERNING NEXT NPG, WE UNDERSTAND THAT ITALY WILL OFFER TO HOST SPRING MINISTERIAL. END SUMMARY.

1. UPDATE BRIEFING ON THE BALANCE OF STRATEGIC FORCES. THIS AGENDA ITEM WILL BE, AS IN THE PAST, A SUBJECT OF KEY INTEREST TO THE MINISTERS. BECAUSE OF THE TIMING OF THE HAMBURG MEETING, THE MINISTERS WILL BE PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN THE RELATIONSHIP OF DEVELOPMENTS IN THE STRATEGIC BALANCE TO SALT. THEIR QUESTIONS ARE APT TO FOCUS ON HIGH-VISIBILITY TOPICS SUCH AS THE US CRUISE MISSILE PROGRAM, THE BACKFIRE BOMBER ISSUE, SOVIET MIRV DEVELOPMENTS, AND SOVIET SALT COMPLIANCE RECORD. THE BRIEFING FOR THE HAMBURG NPG IS INTENDED AS AN UPDATE, AND THEREFORE WE ENVISION THAT IT WOULD BE SHORTER THAN LAST SPRING'S PRESENTATION. WE BELIEVE, THEREFORE, THAT THE BRIEFING OUGHT TO FOCUS ON KEY STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENTS OVER THE PAST HALF YEAR, AND ON ISSUES, SUCH AS THOSE INDICATED ABOVE, WHERE IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO PRESENT THE LATEST AND BEST INFORMATION WE HAVE AVAILABLE.

2. NUCLEAR EMPLOYMENT POLICY - US NUCLEAR WEAPONS EMPLOYMENT POLICY. TO OUR ALLIES, THE CRITICAL ASPECT OF US STRATEGIC EMPLOYMENT POLICY IS ITS FIRM LINKAGE TO DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE IN EUROPE. THIS AGENDA ITEM IS A FITTING COMPANION TO THE PRECEDING ITEM'S TREATMENT OF STRATEGIC FORCES, SINCE IT PERMITS A CONTINUATION OF THE DISCUSSIONS WE HAVE HAD WITH OUR ALLIES OVER THE PAST TWO YEARS ON THE STRENGTHENING OF ALLIANCE DETERRENCE PROVIDED BY THE MODIFICATIONS IN US EMPLOYMENT POLICIES THAT WERE ANNOUNCED EARLY IN 1974. OUR ALLIES POSSESS A GENERAL  
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KNOWLEDGE OF THOSE MODIFICATIONS AS A RESULT OF PAST NPG PERMREP AND MINISTERIAL DISCUSSIONS AND THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE'S STATEMENT TO THE DPC IN JUNE 1974. THEY HAVE REACTED FAVORABLY TO THE INTRODUCTION OF GREATER FLEXIBILITY IN US STRATEGIC POLICY, AND IN PARTICULAR TO CONTRIBUTION OF LIMITED STRATEGIC OPTIONS IN STRENGTHENING THE COUPLING OF THE US STRATEGIC DETERRENT TO EUROPE. THE PAPER ON US NUCLEAR EMPLOYMENT POLICY THAT WE CIRCULATED TO THE NPG ALLIES LAST AUGUST (NPG/D(75)5) IS AN EXPANSION OF PREVIOUSLY PROVIDED INFORMATION WHICH SHOULD HELP IN INCREASING ALLIES UNDERSTANDING OF AND CONFIDENCE IN THE RELEVANCE OF US NUCLEAR EMPLOYMENT POLICY TO NATO SECURITY.

3. IN THE SECRETARY'S REMARKS, IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO UNDERScore

THE CONSISTENCY OF THE US NUCLEAR EMPLOYMENT POLICY WITH AGREED NATO POLICY, IN PARTICULAR NUCLEAR POLICIES DEVELOPED IN THE NPG. THERE ARE, OF COURSE, CERTAIN ASPECTS CONTAINED IN THE US PAPER THAT ARE REFINED OR DEVELOPED TO A GREATER DEGREE THAN IN CURRENT NATO POLICY, AND THUS WE BELIEVE THE VALUE OF THIS AGENDA ITEM LIES IN INCREASING ALLIED UNDERSTANDING OF THE US POLICY IN ORDER TO BENEFIT THE WORK THAT THE NPG IS EXPECTED TO UNDERTAKE IN PHASE III ON OVERALL THEATER NUCLEAR EMPLOYMENT POLICY. WE DO NOT ANTICIPATE THAT THE MINISTERS WOULD TAKE DIRECT ISSUE WITH ANY OF THE PARTS OF THE US PAPER. HOWEVER, QUESTIONS THAT MINISTERS MIGHT RAISE INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING:

A) THE PROSPECTS OF CONTROLLING ESCALATION, IN LIGHT OF NATO INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES INDICATING PROBABILITY OF SOVIET WIDE-SCALE NUCLEAR RESPONSE TO NATO'S FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS;

B) WHETHER THE AVAILABILITY OR USE OF LIMITED STRIKES FROM THE US STRATEGIC ARSENAL WOULD WEAKEN DETERRENCE BY LESSENING SOVIET PERCEPTION OF THE RISK OF A NATO GENERAL NUCLEAR RESPONSE;

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C) GIVEN A SITUATION OF STRATEGIC PARITY, WHAT ASSURANCE THE US HAS OF ACHIEVING THE OBJECTIVE IN GENERAL NUCLEAR WAR OF MAXIMIZING THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY POWER OF THE US AND ITS ALLIES RELATIVE TO THE ENEMY IN THE POST-WAR PERIOD;

D) WHETHER NATO NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES ARE SUFFICIENTLY SURVIVABLE TO ACHIEVE THE OBJECTIVE OF TRANS-ATTACK STABILITY CALLED FOR IN THE US POLICY;

E) THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LNO'S, RNO'S, AND SEP'S;

F) WHETHER, IN A CONFLICT INVOLVING NATO, LNO'S MIGHT BE USED FOR THE INITIAL NUCLEAR STRIKES, AND WHETHER SUCH STRIKES MIGHT EXTEND INTO THE SOVIET UNION;

G) APART FROM THE INCORPORATION OF GREATER FLEXIBILITY, HOW THE TARGETING OF US STRATEGIC FORCES IN MAO' SNA SAO'S DIFFERS FROM PREVIOUS SIOP TARGETING.

4. THE US INDICATED LAST AUGUST THAT THE PAPER ON US NUCLEAR WEAPONS EMPLOYMENT POLICY WAS INTENDED AS A CONTRIBUTION TO THE SECRET

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WORK OF PREPARING AN OVERALL CONCEPT FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES BY NATO. IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO DRAW ATTENTION TO THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE PRINCIPLES AND OBJECTIVES SET FORTH IN THE US PAPER AND THE WORK TO BE CONDUCTED IN PHASE III.

5. NUCLEAR EMPLOYMENT POLICY - SEPS. WE ASSUME THAT SACEUR'S REMARKS WILL PROVIDE A BRIEF SUMMARY OF PROGRESS AT SHAPE ON DEVELOPMENT OF SELECTIVE EMPLOYMENT PLANS (SEPS). HIS REMARKS PRESUMABLY WILL EXPAND UPON THE BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE SEP'S PROGRAM THAT THE NMAS PROVIDED TO THE NPG IN DECEMBER 1974, AND SHOULD HELP TO SATISFY ALLIED INTEREST IN KEEPING ABREAST OF DEVELOPMENTS IN THIS AREA. MINISTERS WILL PROBABLY BE INTERESTED IN UNDERSTANDING BETTER THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SACEUR'S SEP PROGRAM AND RNO'S IN THE US EMPLOYMENT POLICY. THEY MAY HAVE QUESTIONS ON HOW POLITICAL OBJECTIVES MIGHT BE FACTORED INTO THE PRE-PLANNING OF SELECTIVE STRIKES AND ON THE SCALES OF USE AND GEOGRAPHICAL LIMITS ENVISIONED IN SEPS. MINISTERS MAY ALSO INQUIRE WHETHER SEPS AND LNOS OFFER ALTERNATIVE OPTIONS FOR ACHIEVING SIMILAR POLITICAL AND MILITARY OBJECTIVES, AND WHETHER COORDINATED LIMITED STRIKES MIGHT BE ENVISIONED FROM THEATER AND EXTERNAL FORCES. OVERALL, WE ANTICIPATE THAT THE ALLIES WILL VIEW SEPS AS A CONTRIBUTION TO ENHANCING RESPONSIVENESS OF SELECTIVE RELEASE PROCESS AND WILL ENCOURAGE FURTHER PROGRESS BY SACEUR.

6. NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURE ISSUES. WE BELIEVE THAT THIS PROBABLY WILL BE THE MOST IMPORTANT ITEM ON THE NPG AGENDA. THE ISSUES RAISED IN LAST SPRING'S NUNN AMENDMENT REPORT TO CONGRESS, ALLIED FAMILIARITY WITH THE ISSUES WHICH DELAYED THE SUBMISSION OF THE US DPQ, THE CURRENT FOCUS ON OPTION III IN MBFR, AND CONTINUING CONGRESSIONAL AND PUBLIC ATTENTION ON NUCLEAR DEPLOYMENTS IN EUROPE MAKE IT CERTAIN THAT THIS TOPIC WILL BE OF PARTICULAR INTEREST TO MINISTERS. SECRETARY KISSINGER RAISED WITH THE ALLIES AT THE NAC MINISTERIAL (REF A), THE NEED TO ESTABLISH A CREDIBLE RATIONALE FOR THE NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURE IN EUROPE. ALLIED UNDERSTANDING OF THIS RATIONAL CAN BEST BE ACHIEVED THROUGH A CAREFUL AND THOROUGH PROCESS OF EDUCATION THAT WILL GAIN ALLIED CONFIDENCE AND SUPPORT FOR CHANGES THAT WE DEEM DESIRABLE. WE HAVE VIEWED THE UPCOMING NPG MINISTERIAL AS OFFERING AN OPPORTUNITY

FOR A CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE WITH OUR ALLIES. OUR APPROACH  
AT THE HAMBURG NPG CAN LARGELY SET THE TONE AND DIRECTION FOR  
SUBSEQUENT INTERACTIONS ON THESE ISSUES.

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7. WE BELIEVE THAA THE APPROACH WE RECOMMENDED LAST AUGUST  
(REF B) OF PRESENTING A CAREFUL, ELEMENTARY AND COHESIVE  
EXPLANATION OF OVERALL THEATER NUCLEAR FORCE STRUCTURE  
CHARACTERISTICS THAT WE WISH TO ACHIEVE IN NATO REMAINS VALID FOR  
ESTABLISHING THE FRAMEWORK FOR ALLIED CONSIDERATION OF SPECIFIC  
CHANGES IN THE THEATER NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURE. SUCH A FRAMEWORK  
COULD ALSO BE HELPFUL IN ALLIED CONSIDERATION OF POTENTIAL NUCLEAR  
REDUCTIONS THAT MIGHT EMERGE FROM MBFR NEGOTIATIONS. ALTHOUGH  
WE HAVE NOT YET SEEN THE LATEST VERSION OF THE TNF IMPROVEMENT  
PAPER, WE BELIEVE THE BROAD OVERVIEW CONTAINED IN THE MOST  
RECENT DRAFT WE HAVE SEEN PROVIDES A GOOD BASIS FOR SECRETARY  
RUMSFELD'S REMARKS. MINISTERS WILL LOOK TO THE SECRETARY OF  
DEFENSE TO PRESENT HIS BROAD VIEWS ON THE KINDS OF TNF ISSUES  
THE US HAS RAISED IN NATO OVER THE PAST YEAR. WE BELIEVE THAT THE  
BROAD THEMES THAT DESERVE EMPHASIS ARE CHANGES THAT ENHANCE  
DETERRENCE THROUGH INCREASED MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS, CONTINUED  
STRONG NUCLEAR COUPLING, AND ASSURANCE OF CONSULTATIONS INVOLVING  
POLITICAL AND MILITARY AUTHORITIES.

8. THERE ARE SEVERAL SENSITIVE ISSUES ABOUT WHICH MINISTERS  
MIGHT RAISE QUESTIONS. THOSE COULD INCLUDE US TAC AIR PROGRAMS  
(SEE, FOR EXAMPLE, THE IS QUESTIONS ON US RESPONSE TO  
DPQ(75) IN REF C), NIKE HERCULES, AND STATUS OF US EXAMINATION OF  
POSSIBLE INCREASED POSEIDON COMMITMENTS. MINISTERS MAY ALSO INQUIRE  
WHAT, IF ANY, ACTIONS ARE UNDER CONSIDERATION IN CONGRESS  
AS A FOLLOW-UP TO THE NUNN AMENDMENT.

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9. PHASE III. NO SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES ARE LIKELY TO ARISE UNDER THIS AGENDA ITEM, SINCE THE PERMREPS REPORT IS ESSENTIALLY PROCEDURAL, AND MINISTERS ARE ONLY CALLED ON TO APPROVE THE APPROACH FOR PREPARATION OF THE PHASE III CONSOLIDATED GUIDELINES THAT THE REPORT RECOMMENDS. WE ANTICIPATE A BRIEF AND SMOOTH MINISTERIAL DISCUSSION. THE PROPOSED PHASE III PROJECT REPRESENTS A KEY INITIATIVE IN THE NPG. IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE AT HAMBURG TO INDICATE THE IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO THE UNDERTAKING AND THE VALUE WE SEE IN THE OPPORTUNITY TO DEVELOP FURTHER NATO NUCLEAR EMPLOYMENT POLICY. IT WOULD ALSO BE DESIRABLE TO MAKE REFERENCE TO THE PAPER ON US NUCLEAR EMPLOYMENT POLICY AS A CONTRIBUTION TO THIS EFFORT.

10. WE HAVE NOT HEARD FURTHER FROM TURKEY OF THE POSSIBILITY OF ITS SEEKING TO JOIN THE PHASE III WORKING GROUP (REF D). IF TURKEY DECIDES TO JOIN, WE ANTICIPATE NO OBJECTIONS, ALTHOUGH THIS COULD RAISE THE POSSIBLITY OF ONE OR ANOTHER NPG MEMBER SUGGESTING THAT THE WORKING GROUP BECOME AN OPEN ENDED ARRANGEMENT, SINCE THE WORKING GROUP COULD NO LONGER BE CHARACTERIZED AS "SMALL."

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11. NUCLEAR CONSULTATION-COUNTRY REQUESTS FOR USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. DISCUSSION SHOULD BE SHORT ON THIS AGENDA ITEM. THE PERMREPS REPORT (NPG/D(75)8) ACCOMMODATES THE PRINCIPAL CONCERN OF THE ALLIES, WHICH IS TO PUT A COUNTRY REQUEST FOR USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON EQUAL FOOTING WITH AN MNC REQUEST FOR PURPOSES OF ACTIVATING THE NUCLEAR CONSULTATION PROCESS. EQUALLY IMPORTANT, HOWEVER, THE REPORT MAKES PROVISION FOR FACTORING IN THE NMAS ASSESSMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS. THE ALLIES WILL WISH TO SEE THE AMPLIFIED PROCEDURES FOR COUNTRY REQUESTS EXERCISED IN FUTURE WINTEXTS. FROM THE US VIEWPOINT, THE KEY PROVISION OF PERMREPS REPORT INS AFFIRMATION THAT ULTIMATE DECISION ON USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS LIES WITH THE NUCLEAR POWER.

12. NUCLEAR CONSULTATION- CNI MESSAGES OF WARNING. MISSION PROVIDED VIEWS ON THIS SUBJECT IN REF E. CANADIAN PERMREP WAS PRIME MOVER IN CAUSING THE REPORT ON THIS SUBJECT (NPG/D(75)9) TO BE CHANGED TO A PROGRESS REPORT RATHER THAN A FINAL REPORT. TO ACCOMMODATE CANADA, WHICH WILL NOT BE REPRESENTED AT HAMBURG, AND POSSIBLY OTHER NPG MEMBERS, IT WILL PROBABLY BE NECESSARY TO LEAVE SOME PROVISION IN THE AGREED MINUTE FOR FURTHER EXAMINATION OF THIS SUBJECT AFTER THE NPG MINISTERIAL. IN OUR VIEW, SUCH EXAMINATION IS NOT LIKELY TO PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT NEW RESULTS.

13. PRINCIPAL RESULT OF THE PERMREPS REPORT IS TO ESTABLISH WARNING MESSAGES AS A POSSIBLE OPTION OPEN TO NATO IN A CRISIS. IN LINE WITH THE REPORT, IT COULD BE USEFUL TO UNDERLINE THAT ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF WARNING MESSAGES CAN ONLY BE JUDGED IN LIGHT OF EACH SITUATION, AND THEREFORE IT IS IMPORTANT TO PRESERVE COMPLETE FLEXIBILITY AND AVOID PRE-JUDGMENT. IT WOULD ALSO BE USEFUL TO STATE US POSITION THAT THE FINAL DECISION TO SEND A WARNING MESSAGE MUST REST WITH THE NUCLEAR POWER CONCERNED. IN THIS CONNECTION, WE BELIEVE ALLIES UNDERSTAND AND ACCEPT THIS POSITION AS IT APPLIES TO MESSAGES CONVEYING SPECIFIC WARNINGS OF NUCLEAR USE DURING A CONFLICT SITUATION. HOWEVER, WE ALSO BELIEVE THAT THE ALLIES WOULD REGARD WARNINGS OF A GENERAL NATURE THAT NATO MIGHT ISSUE DURING A PERIOD OF TENSION OR IN EARLY STAGES OF A CONFLICT AS SUBJECT TO DECISION BY CONSENSUS.

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14. FUTURE WORK PROGRAMS (INCLUDING TIME AND PLACE OF NEXT MEETING). MOST ITEMS COVERED IN SYG LUNS PO ON FUTURE WORK (PO/75/128) WILL BE DISCUSSED UNDER PREVIOUS ITEMS ON THE MINISTERIAL AGENDA, IE, EMPLOYMENT POLICY, FORCE POSTURE ISSUES, PHASE III. TWO ITEMS, HOWEVER, REQUIRE COMMENT. PARAGRAPH 6 OF THE PO NOTES THAT MINISTERS MAY WISH TO HAVE QUESTION OF NUCLEAR NIKE HERCULES STUDIED IN GREATER DEPTH BY THE NMAS. THIS WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH LATEST WASHINGTON GUIDANCE ON THIS MATTER (REF F). ALTERNATIVELY, UK HAS PREVIOUSLY CIRCULATED A PROPOSAL FOR STUDY OF NIKE HERCULES BY AN AD HOC GROUP DRAWN FROM NPG COUNTRIES AND NMAS. WE DO NOT KNOW IF UK WILL RAISE ITS PROPOSAL AT THE HAMBURG MEETING, BUT AS A CONTINGENCY WE BELIEVE US SHOULD HAVE ITS VIEWS IN LINE IN CASE UK DOES SO. WASHINGTON GUIDANCE IN REF F INDICATES POSSIBLE RECEPTIVITY TO UK PROPOSAL. HOWEVER, WE ASSUME US APPROACH WOULD BE GOVERNED LARGELY BY STATUS OF DELIBERATIONS IN WASHINGTON ON PREFERRED DIRECTION FOR FUTURE NIKE HERCULES DEPLOYMENTS. WE BELIEVE THAT UK, AS WELL AS OTHER NPG ALLIES, WOULD BE PREPARED TO DEFER TO US VIEWS CONCERNING ANY FUTURE WORK THAT MIGHT BE UNDERTAKEN ON NIKE HERCULES.

15. PARAGRAPH 7 OF SYG LUNS PO SUGGESTS THAT MINISTERS MAY WISH TO RECEIVE A PRESENTATION WHICH WOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT VARIOUS RECENT REFINEMENTS RELATING TO THE CONSULTATION PROCESS. THIS SUGGESTION WAS INCORPORATED INTO THE PO LARGELY AT UK URGING. UK REVIVED THIS IDEA AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO ILLUSTRATIVE STUDIES FOR FOSTERING DISCUSSION ON SELECTIVE RELEASE AND CONSULTATION PROCEDURES. NEITHER UK NOR OTHERS HAVE INDICATED PRECISELY WHAT THEY MIGHT ENVISION IN SUCH A "PRESENTATION," ALTHOUGH IT MIGHT CORRESPOND WITH THE BROADER APPROACH TO ILLUSTRATIVE STUDIES THAT MISSION ADDRESSED IN REF G. IF UK OR OTHER RAISE THE IDEA OF A "PRESENTATION."

WE BELIEVE A REASONABLE APPROACH FOR MINISTERS WOULD BE  
TO REMAND THE MATTER TO PERMREPS FOR THEIR CONSIDERATION OF  
THE POSSIBLE SCOPE OF SUCH A PRESENTATION, AND FURTHER TASKING  
AS DEEMED APPROPRIATE. THIS APPROACH WOULD KEEP OUR OPTIONS  
OPEN UNTIL WE KNOW MORE ABOUT WHAT MIGHT BE INVOLVED AND  
HOW USEFUL IT MIGHT BE.

16. CONCERNING NEXT NPG, WE UNDERSTAND INFORMALLY THAT  
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ITALY WILL OFFER TO HOST THE SPRING MINISTERIAL. BRUCE

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